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In the Supreme Court
of t:he St:at:e of Ut:ah

\MERICAN INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
;TATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, and
[RWIN ARNOVITZ, R. E. HAMMOND, H. P.
~EATHAM and B. H. ROBINSON,
the members of said Commission,
Defendants.

No. 6305

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an original proceeding in this Court for the
mrpose of reveiwing a decision of the State Tax Commislion of Utah, dated September 11, 1940, in the proceeding
lesignated by the said Commission as "In the Matter of the
~edetermination of Corporation Franchise Tax of AMERI:AN INVESTMENT CORPORATION for the year 1937",
md by which said decision the said Commission decided that
here was due from plaintiff the sum of $296.3 7, with inter~st, as the unpaid deficiency on its corporation franchise tax
or the calendar year 193 7.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
American Investment Corporation, plaintiff herein, is
and was at all times since October 31, 1929, a corporation
organized under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
Nevada, and with its principal place of business at Ely,
Nevada. It is, and was at all times since March 16, 1934,
qualified to do business within the State of Utah as a foreign
corporation. During the year 193 7 (which is the year we
were concerned with) plaintiff was duly qualified to do business within the State of Idaho as a foreign corporation. It is,
and was at all times since its incorporation, primarily engaged in acquiring by stock ownership the control of banking
corporations, and holding the stqcks thereof for the purpose
of controlling the management of the affairs of such other
corporations. During the calendar year it owned stock in,
and exercised control of, Idaho Bank and Trust Co., a banking corporation of the State of Idaho, and Commercial Security Bank, a banking corporation of the State of .Utah
During the year 193 7 the said Idaho Bank and Trust Co.
did no business within the State of Utah, nor has it ever done
business with said state nor has it ever made or been required to make reports to the State of Utah or any departments thereof pursuant to the laws of said state or otherwise.
Commercial Security Bank has at all times filed corporation
franchise returns with the defendant State Tax Commission
of Utah, including such return for the year 193 7, and has at
all times paid all taxes due from it to the State of Utah for
the privilege of doing business within said state.
During the calendar year 193 7 plaintiff had the following gross income:
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Capital gain from sale of Ohio Oil Company
Stock
----------------------------------------------------------$
299.40
Capital gain from sale of Socony
Vacuum Oil Co. Inc. Stock -----------------------4,424.30
Dividends on Socony Vacuum Oil Co. Inc.
125.00
---------------------------------------------------------Stock
Dividend on Ohio Oil Company Stock _________ _
200.00
Dividends on Idaho Bank and Trust Co. Stock
Stock
---------------------------------------------------------6,016'.60
Liquidating dividend on Commercial Security
112.00
Bank -----------------------------------------------------------Making a total gross income of --------------------$11,177.30
All of said income was shown on plaintiff's franchise tax return but in arriving at the amount of its taxable net income
plaintiff deducted from said gross income the whole thereof,
except the liquidating dividend on Commercial Security Bank
in the sum of $112.00. Upon the subsequent audit of said
return by the Commission, the Commission on September 11,
1939, restored to plaintiff's net taxable income the entire
gross income shown in plaintiff's said return and hereinabove
set out, less only the following deductions:
Liquidating dividend on Commercial Security
Bank ____________ ------------------------------------------------$
Federal Tax paid to the United States on
1936 income -----------------------------------------------Other expenses

112.00
362.28
490.00

leaving, according to the Commission, a taxable net income
of $10,212.47, or an increase of $10,100.47 over the amount
of taxable net income as shown by plaintiff, and assessed
an additional tax against plaintiff in the sum of $296.3 7,
with interest from August 1, 1938, at the rate of 6% per
:mnum.
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Within the time allowed by law, on November 3, 1939,
plaintiff duly filed its petition with the said Commission for
a redetermination of said deficiency. Upon the hearing befor the Commission on said petition, the following facts were
established:
That during the period in question, plaintiff was a foreign corporation, with its principal place of business at Ely,
Nevada; that it was qualified to do and doing business
within the State of Utah; that its primary business was in
holding the stock of banking corporations for the purpose
of controlling the management of the affairs thereof; that
it did hold stock in and control the affairs of Idaho Bank
and Trust Co., an Idaho corporation, doing no business within the State of Utah, and Commercial Security Bank, a Utah
corporation; that it also owned stock in Socony Vacuum Oil
Company, a corporation of the State of New York, with its
principal place of business at New York City, and Ohio Oil
Company, a corporation of the State of Ohio, with is principal
place of business at Findlay, Ohio, which said two companies
plaintiff did not control; that of its gross income during the
calendar year 1937, $299.40 was a capital gain from the sale
of Ohio Oil Company stock, $4,424.30 was a capital gain
from the sale of Socony-Vacuum Oil Company stock, $200.00
was a dividend on the Ohio Oil Company stock, $125.00 was
a dividend on the Socony Vacuum Oil Company stock, $6,016.60 was a dividend on Idaho Bank and Trust Company
stock, and $112.00 was a liquidating dividend on Commercial
Security Bank stock.
Under date of September 11, 1940, the Commission
rendered its decision in writing upon plaintiff's said petition
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for redetermination of said deficiency, giving plaintiff notice
of said decision on September 19, 1940. By said decision
the Commission decided that the whole of plaintiff's gross
income, less only the following deductions:
Liquidating dividend on Commercial Security Bank ------------------------------------------------$
Federal Tax paid to the United States
on 1936 income -------------------------------------------Other expenses ------------------------------------------------

112.00
362.28
490.00

constituted plaintiff's taxable net income, and assessed a deficiency tax against plaintiff in the sum of $296.3 7, with interest at 6 per cent per annum from August 1, 1938, to the
date of the decision, and 1 per cent per month from that date
until paid.
Thereafter and within the time allowed by law, plaintiff,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 4 7, Chapter 13, Title
80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, petitioned this Court
to review the said decision of the Commission. Under the
provisions of the Franchise Tax Act (Chapter 13, Title 80,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933), this Court by Certiorari
may review the decision of the Commission on both the law
and the facts.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the decision of
the Commission whereby it assessed a deficiency tax against
plaintiff in the sum of $296.3 7, with interest, is without and
in excess of its powers, and unlawful, for the following
~easons:
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(a) That said deficiency was assessed against
pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 13, Title 80,
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and plaintiff is exempt from
visions thereof by virtue of Section 5 ( 16) of said
and Title.

plaintiff
Revised
the proChapter

(b) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion
by the Commission in plaintiff's net taxable income of the
sum of $6.016.60, which sum was received by plaintiff during 193 7 as dividends on stock owned by it in said Idaho
Bank and Trust Company and was not derived from business
done by plaintiff within the State of Utah, nor is such income
assignable to business done by plaintiff within the State of
Utah.
(c) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $4,424.30,
which sum was received by plaintiff as a gain to it from the
sale of stock of Socony Vacuum Oil Company and was not
derived by plaintiff from business done by it within the State
of Utah, nor is it assignable to business done within the State
of Utah.
(d) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $125.00, which
amount was received by plaintiff as dividends paid to it on
stock of Socony Vacuum Oil Company and was not derived
by plaintiff from business done by it within the State of Utah,
nor is it assignable to business done by plaintiff within the
State of Utah.
(e) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $299.40, which
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amount was received by plaintiff as a gain upon the sale of
stock of Ohio Oil Company and was not derived from business
done by plaintiff within the State of Utah, nor is it assignable
to business done by plaintiff within the State of Utah.
(f) That said deficiency is based upon the inclusion
in plaintiff's net taxable income of the sum of $200.00, which
sum was received by plaintiff as dividends on stock of Ohio
Oil Company and was not derived from business done by
plaintiff within the State of Utah, nor is it assignable to business done by plaintiff within the State of Utah.
ARGUMENT
As shown by the foregoing statement of errors it is the
contention of plaintiff, first, that it is specifically exempt
from the provisions of the Corporation Franchise Tax Act
(Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933), and,
accordingly, no deficiency could be assessed against it pursuant to said Act; and, second, that if it is not so exempt and
said Act applies to plaintiff, nevertheless the said deficiency
assessment is erroneous for the reason that it is based upon the
inclusion in plaintiff's taxable net income of items of gross
income which do not, under the provisions of said Act, consituate taxable net income. These points will be argued
seriatim.
Section 80-13-5, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, exempts
certain corporations from the provisions of said Franchise
Tax Act. Subsection 16 of said section provides as follows:
"Corporations whose sole business consists of holding the stock of other corporations for the purpose of
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controlling the management of affairs of such other
corporations, if such other corporations make returns
under this Chapter."
In other words, corporations of the type referred to in said
sub-section 16 are exempt from the provisions of the Franchise Tax Act.
Heretofore, however, the Commission has held that
plaintiff did not come within the provisions of said exempting
sub-section for two reasons; first, because during the period
in question, plaintiff's sole business did not consist of holding the stock of Idaho Bank and Trust Company and Commercial Security Bank for the purpose of controlling the
management of the affairs of such corporations, and, second,
the plaintiff was authorized by its Articles of Incorporation
to do more than simply hold the stock of other corporations
for the purpose of controlling the management of the affairs
of the same. This position of the Commission, however, is
in direct conflict with the holding of this court in the case
of First Security Corporation of Ogden vs. State Tax Commission, 91 Utah 101, 63 Pac. (2) 1062, wherein no importance was attached by this Court to the faCt that the corporation claiming exemption under the sub-section was in fact
authorized by its Articles of Incorporation to do more, and
in fact did more, than hold stock in other corporations for the
purpose of controlling the management thereof.
In that case this court had before it for determination the
question of whether the First Security Corporation was exempt from the provisions of said Act by virtue of said subsection 16. This court held the First Security Corporation to
be such a corporation as was referred to by said subsection,
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and, accordingly, exempt from the provisions of the Act.
Plaintiff submits that it is the same type of corporation as
the facts in the First Security Corporation case disclosed the
First Security Corporation to be, and that its operations are
substantially similar, and that as this court held the First Security Corporation exempt from the Act, so must plaintiff
likewise be held to be exempt.
The facts in the First Security Corporation case were
stipulated. It appeared that the First Security Corporation,
(like plaintiff), was a foreign corporation organized primarily (not solely) for the purpose of acquiring by stock ownership the control of banking and other corporations, and that
it was qualified as a foreign corporation to do business in the
State of Utah. It bought, held and sold stocks of a corporation other than one of its subsidiaries, namely, Amalgamated
Sugar Company. (This was similar to the action of plaint
-iff in buying, holding and selling stocks in Ohio Oil Company and Socony-Vacuum Oil Company). Like plaintiff, it
held stock holders' meetings in Utah at which reports were
presented and directors elected, and held Directors' meetings
in Utah, at which matters connected with the control and
management of the affairs of its subsidiaries were considered.
And, finally, it was shown that by its charter it, like plaintiff,
had very broad powers, and was not limited to holding stock
in other corporations for the purpose of controlling the same.
This Court, upon those facts, held the First Security Corporation exempt from the provisions of the Corporation Franchise Tax Act. By the same token, we submit, plaintiff like.:'
wise should be held exempt.
The Commission, however, will undoubtedly argue, as
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it has heretofore, that this court, in exempting the First Security Corporation, did not consider the fact that by its
charter it had broad powers, and that it was not a corporation whose sole business consisted in holding stock in other
corporations for the purpose of controlling the same. In other
words, the Commission will undoubtedly argue that if the
Court had properly considered all the facts presented to it
which bore upon the question presented to the Court, this
court would not, in that event, have held the First Security
Corporation exempt. We submit that such argument, if made,
is nothing but gratuitous insult to the Court. The facts presented to the Court showed the broad powers of the First
Security Corporation, and that it in fact was not a corporation
whose sole business consisted in managing, by stock ownership, the affairs of other corporations. The question presented was whether, under all the facts, the corporation came
within the exempting subsection. To now suggest that this
Court deliberately ignored certain facts bearing upon the
question to be decided, to which facts the attention of the
Court had been expressly directed, is but to suggest a laxity
upon the part of the Court which is unwarranted.
However, if it should be determined that this plaintiff
is not exempt from the provisions of the Act, as was the First
Security Corporation, despite the fact that the facts with respect to it are substantially identical with the facts relating
to plaintiff, nevertheless, plaintiff submits the assessment is
erroneous for the reason that it is based upon the inclusion
in plaintiff's next taxable income of gross income which cannot under the provisions of the Act, be considered as taxable
net income, namely, income derived by plaintiff from business
not done by it within the State of Utah.
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Section 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, entitled "Rules for Determining Net Income Allocated to this
State" provides as follows:
"The portion of net income assignable to business
done within this State, and which shall be the basis and
measure of the tax imposed by this Chapter, may be determined by an allocation upon the basis of the following
rules:
( 1) Rents, interest and dividends derived from
business done outside this state less related expenses
shall not be allocated to this state.
( 2) Gains from the sale or exchange of capital
assets consisting of real or tangible personal property
situated outside this state less losses from the sale or exchange of such assets situated outside this state shall not
be allocated to this state.
( 3) Rents, interest and dividends derived from
business done in this state less related expenses shall
be allocated to this state.
( 4) Gains from the sale or exchange of capital
assets consisting of real or tangible personal property
situated within this state less losses from the sale or exchange of such assets situated in this state shall be allocated to this state.
( 5) If the bank or other corporation carries on no
business outside this state, the whole of the remainder
of net income may be allocated to this state.
( 6) If the bank or other corporation carries on
any business outside this state, the said remainder may
be divided into three equal parts:
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be attributed
to business carried on within this state as shall be found
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by multiplying said third by a fraction whose numerator
is the value of the corporation's tangible property situated within this state and whose denominator is the
value of all the corporation's tangible property whereever situated.
(b) Of another third, such portion shall be attributed to business carried on within this state as shall
be found by multiplying said third by a fraction whose
numerator is the total amount expended by the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or other compensation to its employees and assignable to this state and
whose denominator is the total expenditure of the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or other compensation to all of its employees.
(c) Of the remaining third, such portion shall be
attributed to business carried on within this state as shall
be found by multiplying said third by a fraction whose
numerator is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts from business assignable to this state and whose
denominator is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts from all its business.
(d) The amount assignable to this state of ex~
penditures of the corporation for wages, salaries, commissions or other compensation to its employees shall
be such expenditures for the taxable year as represents
the compensation of employees not chiefly situated at,
connected with or sent out from, premises for the trans·
action of business owned or rented by the corporation
outside this state.
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross re·
ceipts from business assignable to this state shall be the
amount of its gross receipts for the taxable year from
(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation by agents or a·
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gencies chiefly situated at, connected with or sent
out from premises for the transaction of business
owned or rented by the corporation outside this
state, and sales otherwise determined by the tax
commission to be attributable to the business conducted on such premises,
(2nd) Rentals or royalties from property situated, or from the use of patents, within this state.
(f) The value of the corporation's tangible property for the purpose of this section shall be the average
value of such property during the taxable year.
( 7) In the allocation of net income, gain or loss
shall be recognized and shall be computed on the same
basis and in the same manner as is provided in this chapter for the determination of net income.
( 8) If in the judgment of the tax commission the
application of the foregoing rules does not allocate to
this state the proportion of net income fairly and equitably attributable to this state, it may with such information as it may be able to obtain make such allociation
as is fairly calculated to assign to this state the portion
of net income reasonably attributable to the business
done within this state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation."
As heretofore pointed out, plaintiff, during the period in
question, received income by way of dividends on stock owned
by it in Idaho Bank and Trust Company in the sum of $6,016.60, in Ohio Oil Company in the sum of $200.00, and in
Socony Vacuum Oil Company in the sum of $125.00. Likewise it had gains from the sale of stock in Ohio Oil Company
in the sum of $299.40, and from the sale of stock in Socony
Vacuum Oil Company in the sum of $4,424.30. As there is
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no suggestion by the Commission that application of subsections ( 1), ( 2), ( 3) and ( 4) above quoted would not allocate
to this state the proportion of net income fairly and equitably
attributable thereto (referring to subsection ( 8)), allocation
of plaintiff's net income should be made pursuant to said
subsections ( 1), (2), ( 3) and ( 4). Plaintiff submits that
such dividends and such gains are within the provisions of
the subsections, and are not, therefore, allocable to income assignable to business done within the State. In this regard
we will first consider the dividends.
It will be noted that the language of the statute is that
"dividends derived by business done outside this state less
related expenses shall not be allocated to this state". The
question to be determined, accordingly, is whether dividends
received by plaintiff on its several stocks were derived by it
from "business done outside this state" or from "business
done in this state". In considering this question an important
factor must be borne in mind. It is that plaintiff was a nonresident of the State of Utah, and was doing business in Utah
solely by virtue of its compliance with the laws of Utah relative to foreign corporations desiring to do business therein.
The state of its domicile was the state of its incorporation,
namely, Nevada. The fact that it was doing business in states
other than that of Nevada (and it is not denied that it was
doing business in other states, including Utah) does not alter
the fact that it was domiciled in Nevada, and a non-resident
insofar as states other than Nevada are concerned. Booth v.
Weigand, 28 Utah 372, 79 Pac. 570; Wilso,n v. Triumph Cons.
Min. Co. 19 Utah 66; 56 Pac. 300. This is not a case of a
state endeavoring to tax the entire income of one of its citizens from whatever source it may be derived. Such, we conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cede, might be done if the taxing statute so provided. But
here the state of Utah is endeavoring to base a tax upon and
measure the same by the income of one who is not one of its
citizens. In so doing it is limited to a consideration of income
derived solely from business done within its borders, as it
cannot use as the basis of the tax income from business done
without the state. California Packing Corporatio,n v. State
Tax Commission, 97 Utah 367, 93 Pac. (2) 463. It is important, accordingly, to determine whether the receipt of dividends
by plaintiff on stock of corporations which did no business
within the state of Utah constitutes income derived by
plaintiff from business done by it within such state.
The Supreme Court of the United States early adopted
the rule that the situs of intangibles for taxation purposes is
the domicile of the owner. Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S.
1, 48 S. Ct. 410, 72 L. Ed. 749; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.
S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056. Subsequently such
court modified such rule somewhat in the case of Wheeling
Steel Corporation v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773, 80 L.
Ed. 1143, by holding that intangibles can acquire a business
situs apart from the residence of the owner so as to be there
taxable. Still more recent decisions have tended back to the
original domicile theory of taxation of intangibles. Newark
Fire Ins. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 59 S. Ct. 918, 83 L. Ed.
1312, 307 U. S. 313; Curry v. McCanless, 59 S. Ct. 900;
83 L. Ed. 1339, 307 U.S. 357. And so if this case involved the
question of the power of the state to tax the intangibles themselves it might become necessary for this court to decide
which theory it would follow. But that question is not here
involved, nor is it necessary for this court to determine
whether the stocks themselves acquired such a situs within
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the State of Utah as to permit such state to tax them. We
are here concerned with quite a different matter, namely, the
question of the income (dividends) received from the stock,
as distinguished from the stock itself. This question cannot
be answered simply by a determination of the situs of the
stock itself for the purpose of taxation, but depends upon entirely different considerations. In this connection we do not
desire to be taken as conceding that the stock itself had acquired a situs in Utah sufficient to justify a tax thereon. The
record is entirely devoid of any showing relative thereto other
than that the stock was kept in Utah as a matter of convenience to the owner, and even those courts which have permitted the taxation of intangibles in states other than that of
the domicile of the owner on the theory that such intangibles
have acquired a "business situs" separate and apart from that
of the owner, require definite evidence that the intangibles
were integral parts of the business conducted. As pointed
out by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Newark Fire Ins. v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra,
"To overcome the presumption of domiciliary location, the proof of business situs must definitely connect
the intangibles as an integral part of the local activity.
The facts presented by this record fall far short of this
requirement.''
And by the same court in the case of New York ex rel. Cohn
v. Graves, 81 L. Ed. 666, 300 U. S. 308, wherein it was contended by the resident tax payer that certain bonds (which
were physically located outside the taxing state) had attained
a "business situs" separate and apart from that of his residence:
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"Appellant also argues that the interest from the
bonds is immune from taxation by New York because
they have acquired a business situs in New Jersey within the doctrine of New Orleans v. Stempel, * * * *. This
contention, if pertinent to the present case, is not supported by the record. The stipulation of facts discloses
only that the bonds and mortgages were located in New
Jersey. * * * * The burden rested upon the tax payer
to present further facts which would establish a "business situs"."
Similarly interesting is the discussion of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma on this point in the case of Chestnut Securities Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission et al., 48 Pac. (2)
817. Chestnut Securities Corporation was a Delaware Corporation, having been granted its charter December 14, 1931.
On December 28, 1931, it was licensed to do business in Oklahoma. All of its stockholders and directors lived in Tulsa,
Oklahoma; all of its business was transacted from its Tulsa
office; all of its directors meetings were held in Tulsa; all of
its properties were controlled from T~lsa (although certain
of its intangibles were physically absent from Oklahoma) ;
and it was also shown that the Company did no business anywhere except in Oklahoma. In considering the question as
to whether the intangibles which were physically absent from
Oklahoma had acquired a business situs there, the Court said:
"The corporation is a legal entity separate and distinct from the directors and officers. The residence of
the latter cannot affect the domicile of the former, and
we do not consider the residence of the directors a determining factor herein. Control of the intangible property is a factor to be considered, but such control
must be so evercised that the intangible property
is actually used or employed by the non-resident corporation in its business transacted in this state. There is
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evidence that these stocks, bonds, etc., were never used
in the business of plaintiff transacted in this state. It
is true that the evidence also discloses that the plaintiff
did not transact business at any other place, but it is not
inconceivable that at the time the plaintiff received its
charter from the state of Delaware, or at least before
it was licensed to do business in this state, it invested a
part of its capital stock in the intangible properties which
are sought to be taxed here and held them thereafter as
an investment. There is no evidence that plaintiff purchased and held these properties in foreign states for the
purpose of evading the tax laws of this state, and we cannot presume that it did so."
In the present case, plaintiff contends the evidence failed
to disclose that the stock had acquired a business situs in
Utah. If such was the case the only situs it had was a domjiciliary situs in the state of Nevada. As neither the stock itself,
nor the enterprise represented by the stock, had a situs in the
state of Utah, under the decision of this court in the case of
California Packing Corporation v. State Tax Commission,
supra, the income therefrom was not taxable. However, if
we care to assume that the stock itself did have a business
situs within the state of Utah, nevertheless the income therefrom is not taxable by Utah, nor can it be used as a basis for a
determination of the tax under the Franchise Tax Act, for the
reason that the income on the stock (dividends), as distinguished from the stock itself, was not derived from business
done by plaintiff within the State of Utah. The act says that
"dividends derived from business done outside this state * *
* * shall not be allocated to this state". The dividends which
this plaintiff received from Idaho Bank and Trust Company
were from business done by that company in Idaho. No business, which resulted in the payment of dividends by that com-
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pany to plaintiff, was done in Utah. The dividends were
earned in Idaho, and payment thereof made in Idaho. The
fact that they were received by plaintiff in Utah cannot be
construed as meaning that they were received from business
done in Utah. Plaintiff might have requested that the checks
be mailed to it in any other state, and such a request and subsequent compliance therewith by the bank, could not constitute doing business in the state to which the checks were
mailed.
It seems to us that an analysis of the statute can result

in no other conclusion than that to which we have arrived,
namely, that the receipt of dividends in the State of Utah
on stock physically held therein by a non-resident, which
stock. is in a corporation foreign to the State of Utah and
which does no business within the State of Utah, does not
constitute income derived from business done in the State of
Utah, and that authority to support such conclusion should
be unnecessary. It may be lack of necessity for such authority accounts for the dearth thereof, as plaintiff has been unable to fnnd but a single case directly in point. Such case is
Stanley Works v. Hackett, Tax Commissioner, 190 Atl. 743
(Conn.). Stanley Works was a Connecticut corporation, and
it, in the year 193 5, in addition to other business done by it,
held stock in three Canadian corporations, being the sole
owner of all of the stock of such corporations. Such corporations were, however, under the active management of managers resident in Canada, and did no business whatever outside the Dominion of Canada. Stanley Works received the
sum of $720,97 5 in dividends on its stock holding in such corporations, showing the same in its return to the state of Connecticut, but not including the same in its computation of the
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amount of the franchise tax due the state of Connecticut. The
tax commissioner overruled the Company's claim that such
amount should not be included in the computation of the tax
and imposed an additional tax of $14,168,99 on account of
this item. We quote the following from the opinion of the
Oklahoma court in that case:
"We are not here concerned with the bare question
whether in measuring a tax imposed upon a corporation
for the privilege of doing busines sin a state dividends received upon the stock of other corporations may be included with income it receives from other sources. See
McCoach v. Minehill & S. H. R. Co., 228, U. S. 295,
308, 33 S. Ct. 419, 57 L. Ed. 842. The question before
us is whether, in working out the scheme of the statute
for the allocation of income within and without the state,
dividends upon the stock of the Canadian corporations
fall within one class or the other. The specific provision
of the statute determinative of the present case is as follows: 'Interest,dividends, royalties and gains from sales
of intangible assets, less related expenses, when received
by a company having its principal place of business within the state, shall be allocated to the state and, when received by a company having its principal place of business without the state, shall be allocated without the
state; provided, when it can be clearly established that
such income is received in connection with business within the state, such income shall be allocated to the state
without regard to the location of the principal place of
business of the taxpayer, and a similar rule shall apply
to such income received in connection with business without the state.' Section 420c( 1).
The method of allocation provided is applied to net
income. As under the provision concerning deductions
dividends upon the stock of domestic corporations are in
in general to be deducted in the determination of the net
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income, it follows that the word 'dividends' as used in
the quotation above can only refer to dividends upon the
stock of the small class of corporations of this country
which do not pay a federal income tax or dividends received upon stock of foreign corporations. The state
contends that the phrase 'in connection with business
within the state' and the corresponding phrase with reference to 'business without the state' refer only to the
business done by the corporation itself within or without
the state, that the business done by the Canadian corporations cannot properly be regarded as business done by
the plaintiff and that therefore the provision is not applicable. While for many purposes the law might not
regard the plaintiff as doing business in Canada by
reason of the ownership of all the stock in the Canadian
corporations, in our approach to tax legislation we may
properly view it from the standpoint of substance, and
not of form (Cardozo, ]., People ex rei. Alpha
Portland Cement Co. v. Knapp, 230 N. Y. 48, 57, 129
N. E. 202); and, if we. do, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the plaintiff 'made use of the activities of these
subsidiary corporations as essential parts of its business'
(National Leather Co. v. Commonwealth, 256 Mass.
419, 423, 152 N. E. 916, 917); and that it 'did, in a very
real and practical sense, employ these stocks as an instrumentality in carrying on its business' (National
Leather Co. v. Massachusetts, 277 U. S. 413, 423, 48 S
Ct. 534, 535, 536, 72 L. Ed. 935); so that the business
of the Canadian corporations might be regarded as its
business. 1\tloreover, the contention of the state would
necessarily exclude all 'dividends' received by the plaintiff from the operation of the provision in question, because they would only represent ownership of stock of
corporations other than the plaintiff. This would re
quire that the words 'such income' be related to the
other three items mentioned at the beginning of the provision to the exclusion of 'dividends'; and such grammatical construction has no warrant in the terms of the
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statute. In fact, the use of the broad words 'in connection with business' has significance, for had the narrower
construction contended for by the state been intended,
it would have been natural for the Legislature to use a
phrase with a more restricted meaning. The intent of
the statute as regards 'dividends' within the scope of
this provision evidently was a substitute for the complicated provisions of the federal act designed to afford
protection against double taxation as regards dividends
not deductible in determining net income, a simpler provision applicable alike to them and to the other types of
income delt with in this portion of the law. As in this
case the dividends in question were all earned upon business done in the Dominion of Canada, they should be
allocated without the state."
While, as heretofore pointed out, we have been unable
to find but the single case wherein the courts have found it
necessary to advise the taxing authorities of a state that they
cannot tax the income of a foreign corporation received as
dividends upon stock owned by it in a second foreign corporation, the courts have, on numerous occasions, held that the
owning or holding of stocks in domestic corporations does not
constitute "doing" or "transacting" business within the states
of the domestic corporations domicile, even though the stock
ownership is sufficient to control the domestic corporations,
and that the purchase of stock does not constitute doing or
transacting business. Crockin v. Boston Store of Ft. Myers,
188 So. 853 (Fla); State ex rel City of St. Louis v. Public
Service Commission of Missouri, 73 S. W. (2) ·393; United
States Rubber Company v. Query, 19 F. Supp. 191; Mannington v. Hocking Valley Ry Co., 183 Fed. 133; State v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 263 S. W. 319 (Tex.). In other words
even though Idaho Bank and Trust Company had been a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
Utah corporation, the income received by plaintiff as dividends on stock held therein would not be taxable in Utah
under the present Utah statute, because, the statute bases
the tax only on income received from "business done in this
state", and the holding of stock does not constitute "doing
business". Since the holding of stock by plaintiff in a Utah
corporation would not constitute the doing of business by
plaintiff in Utah, the receipt of dividends on such stock holdings could not be construed as income from business done in
this state. Thus considered it is inconceivable upon what
theory the holding of stock by plaintiff in a foreign corporation could be construed as the doing of business by plaintiff in
Utah, so as to constitute dividends received by it on such
stock holdings as income received from "business done in
this state".
We have so far limited our discussion to a consideration
of the dividends received by plaintiff upon stock held by
it in Idaho Bank and Trust Company, but what has been said
as to those dividends applies with even greater force to the
dividends received upon stock held in Socony Vacuum Oil
Company and Ohio Oil Company, as plaintiff was but another
stockholder insofar as those companies were concerned, while
it was the principal stockholder of Idaho Bank and Trust
Company. Holding or owning stock by a foreign corporation
in another corporation does not constitute "doing business"
in a state other than that of the foreign corporation's domicile,
(cases cited supra), and, accordingly, dividends received by
plaintiff on stock owned by it in other corporations are not
dividends from "business done in this state".
Consideration of plaintiff's gains from the sale of stock

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II

24

of Socony Vacuum Oil Company and Ohio Oil Company requires a somewhat different approach than that involved in
the consideration of the dividends received by plaintiff. As
a premise to this portion of our argument, we submit the
proposition that if the gain is to be allocated to Utah for the
purpose of determining the amount of plaintiff's franchise
tax the same must be allocated pursuant to Section 80-13-21,
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, heretofore set out in full
herein. In other words, since we are dealing with the problem of determining the amount plaintiff owes the State of
Utah for the privilege of doing business therein for a certain
year, and since the legislature has seen fit to provide certain
rules for the determination thereof, such determination must
be in accord with such rules as so fixed by the legislature. We
do not suggest that the legislature could not have fixed other
rules, or more inclusive rules, but that the rules fixed by the
legislature, whatever they may be, are exclusive of any other
method of determination.

It will be noted that included in the rules for determining net income allocated to this state as fixed by the legislature are two rules and no others dealing with gains from the
sales or exchange of capital assets, which rules are set out in
subsections (2) and (4) of Section 80-13-21. (We are, in
this connection, excluding consideration of subsection ( 8),
because the Tax Commission has never intimated that such
subsection had any application here.) Subsection ( 2) provides that "gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets
consisting of real or tangible property situate outside this state
* * * shall not be allocated to this state," while subsection
( 4) provides that "gains from the sale or exchange of capital
assets consisting of real or tangible property situated within
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this stat * * * shall be allocated to this state". (italics supplied) Those two subsections deal exclusively with real or
tangible property, and do not purport to refer in any wise to
intangible property. The legislature has, therefore, failed to
provide for allocation of gains from the sale or exchange of
intangible property, and, having so failed, the Commission
has no authority to make any allocation whatever of the gains
from the sale or exchange of intangible property, and a consideration thereof has no place in the determination of plaintiff's franchise tax. As shares of stock in corporations are in
tangible property - Gallatin County Farmers' Alliance Vt
Flannery, 197 Pac. 996, and cases therein cited - it follows
that plaintiff's gain from the sale of its stock holdings
in Socony Vacuum Oil Company and Ohio Oil Company constituted gains from the sale of intangible property, and the
Tax Commission was without authority to allocate the same.
Again we desire to point out that we are not urging that the
legislature could not have provided for allocation of gains
from the sale of intangibles, the same as it provided for allocation of dividends received therefrom, but it has not so
provided and the Commission is bound by what the legislature has done in this regard, and not by what it could have
done.
It is not, however, necessary fo rplaintiff to rest upon
the failure of the legislature to allocate these gains, because,
had subsection ( 2) and ( 4) included gains from the sale or
exchange of intangibles as well as tangibles, the gains received from the sale by plaintiff from the sale of these stocks
would have been allocated outside the state under subsection
( 2), for the reason that they are gains from the sale of property situate outside the state of Utah. This because, as they
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are intangibles, the presumption is that their situs is the domicile of plaintiff, namely, Nevada, and there is no sufficient
showing that they had attained a business situs in Utah separate and apart from their domicilary situs.
CONCLUSION

.

Y+(lr~~~~LAL ;;( ~ ~

:rt"~eee~~af, re~t YpeB ~
that the decision of the Tax Commission in assessing a deficiency tax against plaintiff for the privilege of doing business in Utah during the year 1935, is erroneous, first, because
it was assessed pursuant to Chapter 13, Title 80, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and such Chapter has, by virtue of
Section 80-13-5 (16) no application to plaintiff, second, because it is based upon the inclusion in plaintiff's net taxable
income of dividends received by plaintiff on stock owned by
it, which dividends were not derived from business done in
this state, and, accordingly, were not allocable to Utah, and,
third, because it is based upon the inclusion in plaintiff's net
taxable income of gains to plaintiff from the sale of intangible
property, and gain from the sale of intangibles are not, under
the provisions of 80-13-21, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933,
allocable to U tab.

Respectfully submitted,
DeVINE, HOWELL & STINE and
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
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